"Wanting truth is not the same as being fit to receive it." Does this mean deceiving people is okay if they are not "fit" to receive it? What should one do if one finds this provoking one's paranoia about whether others are telling one the truth because _they judge_ one as not being "fit" (regardless of the objective truth of the matter)?
Note though as per the rules stated, you should define what "fit" is first in explicit and logical, clear terms because we have to make sure this is intelligible first before disagreement can be claimed - and it may be that any apparent perception of disagreement here is the result of unintelligibility (which is my current going assumption about where I am coming from in regard to it as I pose these questions, that it is unintelligible to me because of idiolectal and life experience differences).
Thank you very much for reading, and even more so for the question!
I cannot see anything in the essay that would imply or allow for deception, let alone solely because someone is judged “unfit” to receive the truth. That would be a different moral claim entirely, and not even remotely the one being made. I am unsure how that could follow.
The point on “fitness” is much narrower and descriptive. Sometimes, a person may sincerely want to know what is true, but lack one or more of the conditions that make inquiry possible. For example, a willingness to revise prior commitments, stable use of terms, or openness to certain types of reasoning or evidence. In those cases, one may still tell the truth, but inquiry itself is not occurring. Here, “fitness” is a functional term meaning alignment with the stated conditions, and not a personal or moral description.
It does not follow that deception is allowed. It simply means that a different “game” is being played. This could be persuasion, rhetoric, conflict, or something else. This often happens without anyone explicitly noticing the shift.
I do understand and take the concern about unintelligibility very seriously. In fact, the purpose of this framework is to reduce precisely that kind of paranoia by insisting that certain conditions be explicit rather than silently assumed without question or confirmation. When they aren’t, as we’ve all seen, confusion and mistrust tend to arise.
Thank you again for reading and for such a thought-provoking question!
"Wanting truth is not the same as being fit to receive it." Does this mean deceiving people is okay if they are not "fit" to receive it? What should one do if one finds this provoking one's paranoia about whether others are telling one the truth because _they judge_ one as not being "fit" (regardless of the objective truth of the matter)?
Note though as per the rules stated, you should define what "fit" is first in explicit and logical, clear terms because we have to make sure this is intelligible first before disagreement can be claimed - and it may be that any apparent perception of disagreement here is the result of unintelligibility (which is my current going assumption about where I am coming from in regard to it as I pose these questions, that it is unintelligible to me because of idiolectal and life experience differences).
Thank you very much for reading, and even more so for the question!
I cannot see anything in the essay that would imply or allow for deception, let alone solely because someone is judged “unfit” to receive the truth. That would be a different moral claim entirely, and not even remotely the one being made. I am unsure how that could follow.
The point on “fitness” is much narrower and descriptive. Sometimes, a person may sincerely want to know what is true, but lack one or more of the conditions that make inquiry possible. For example, a willingness to revise prior commitments, stable use of terms, or openness to certain types of reasoning or evidence. In those cases, one may still tell the truth, but inquiry itself is not occurring. Here, “fitness” is a functional term meaning alignment with the stated conditions, and not a personal or moral description.
It does not follow that deception is allowed. It simply means that a different “game” is being played. This could be persuasion, rhetoric, conflict, or something else. This often happens without anyone explicitly noticing the shift.
I do understand and take the concern about unintelligibility very seriously. In fact, the purpose of this framework is to reduce precisely that kind of paranoia by insisting that certain conditions be explicit rather than silently assumed without question or confirmation. When they aren’t, as we’ve all seen, confusion and mistrust tend to arise.
Thank you again for reading and for such a thought-provoking question!